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stringent than the obligations to mere temperance and justice, because (p. 195) it is these "finite virtues" which "make life possible, and are the pre-conditions of ideal perfection itself," or (as is elsewhere said) because they are primary, and superior quantitatively. We are, however, provided (also on p. 195) with another reason for the less stringency of obligation of the ideal life as compared with "finite virtues,"—namely, the claims of the ideal life are only self-regarding, whereas the claims of justice concern others as well as self. This seems to be in conflict with the general ethical doctrine of the work, that the end is realization of self; still, that the author means to lay stress upon it is evident from his going on to say, on p. 196, that "when there is a conflict of duties—*i.e.*, a conflict between the ideal life and finite virtues—there can be no doubt where the supreme obligation lies,"—*viz.*, with the finite virtues.

Is precise and adequate guidance to be obtained from a consideration of the virtues of temperance and justice, which are the only finite virtues discussed at any length? Temperance is identified with self-control, and is described as action which considers the future as well as the present of the agent. It is also defined as "appetitive justice," or justice in the region of appetition. Negative justice is said to be "a balance of the altruistic and self-regarding feelings within the man," "the fundamental relation of one person to other persons in community," "the freedom of each citizen to realize himself consistently with the freedom of every other." "The obligation of justice is an obligation of reason, giving the rule to the complex of inner feeling with a view to harmony or non-contradiction."

Positive justice is "a conscious positive desire and effort to help others to realize themselves" (with a certain limitation). Justice generally is "the peace of harmony"—"equality as subject to a higher end than that contained in any particular desire." Justice is "the moral law," "the idea in relations." "In this idea of relations—justice—lies the law of conduct, by which we mean the law of motive; in this lies moral obligation." Justice "embraces all the social virtues" (p. 170); it is "an expression for the *law* of man's inner organism as ascertained by reason."

But we learn later that justice is "an elastic idea;" and that since "the heart of justice is an altruistic emotion," it is "impossible for the term 'justice' to preserve any hard and fast definition."

All this seems to leave us with as little distinct guidance as the notion of self-realization itself; even supposing the difficulty as to the relation between the ideal life and finite virtue to have been cleared up, we find no consistent definite systematic account either of the ideal life itself or of the particular virtues. And to complete our disappointment, we are told at p. 288 that the attainment of self-realization is, for finite beings, "manifestly impossible."

E. E. C. JONES.

ETHIK. Encyklopädische Skizzen u. Literaturangaben zur Sittenlehre. I. PRAKTISCHE ETHIK. Von Georg Runze. Berlin, 1891: Carl Duncker. Pp. viii, 274, 8vo.

The treatise on ethics, which Herr Georg Runze, professor at the University of Berlin, has begun in the volume before us, though at first sight unusual,

nevertheless starts from very correct premises, and is decidedly meritorious in its execution. It is an undeniable fact that in ethical literature the speculative and fundamental questions stand decidedly in the foreground, and in the existing treatise are especially considered. But this method of treatment is prejudicial to ethics, which is thus deprived of a great part of its practical effect. For it is a peculiarity of ethics that it proves the correctness of its principles on the one hand by successful explanation of the real facts of moral life, and on the other hand by their ability to furnish a criterion and a standard of action in the innumerable and difficult questions of actual life which underlie moral direct judgment, and by virtue of the direct feeling and individual reflection involve an appeal to the ripe, comparative judgment of science. It is true that most treatises on the fundamental questions of ethics include a practical part, which undertakes to apply to the concrete conditions of life the theoretically developed conceptions. But the larger the amount of material involved, the more inevitable is it that the selection is regulated by the individual choice of the author. Rarely do these treatments of the subject vouchsafe an adequate conception of other views and of the differences that exist, and this lack is all the more perceptible because the various treatments of the history of ethics are occupied more with the differences of the theoretical basis than with the practical application to the matter in hand. Even such newer works as the books of Ziegler and Köstlin, which explicitly hold out the promise of a remedy in this direction, still stand too far removed from the threshold of the present to be able to compensate for the lack of a systematic treatment of ethics.

Runze's book undertakes to set these defects aside. Its arrangement suggests a middle ground between simple bibliography and an independent theoretical discussion of the questions likely to be raised in the sphere of applied ethics. Divided into three parts of eighty-six paragraphs in all (the individual, the community, and the inter-relations between the individual and the community), no essential question of applied individual and social ethics will be found wanting in the rich material of Runze's book. Asceticism, suicide, slavery, the emancipation of women, to take a few subjects at random, are treated here, as well as marriage and prostitution, honor and the duel, luxury and the care of the poor, etc. The treatment of the chief points is as follows. The author, in the first place, briefly puts together a number of definitions and propositions relating to the subject; secondly, in a more elaborate form, he gives a critical sketch of the most important of the ideas and opinions that have been brought out in the attempted solutions of the problem in ancient and in modern times; and he closes with a list of the literature bearing upon the question, not stopping short at monographs, but referring also to works of a more general character in which the special point in question is discussed.

For the most part he confines himself to modern literature, whereas older works—*i.e.*, those going back beyond the eighteenth century—are only exceptionally mentioned. The abundance of these bibliographical references, and also of the "*Thesaurus Controversiarum Ethices*," which precedes and to some extent rests upon the bibliography, is quite extraordinary, and cannot be too highly commended. The author has extended his search even to periodical literature to a great extent. If Runze is to be criticised at all, it is because he has given

too much rather than too little. As a catalogue for all pertinent questions regarding ethics, the book is absolutely indispensable, and will be valuable for a long time, not only for the student of ethics in the narrow sense, but also for pedagogues, theologians, clergymen, jurists, lawgivers, statesmen. The fact that one does not everywhere sympathize with the author's own views does not diminish the value of the book as a work of reference, highly stimulating in its character. The clearness and purity of the moral sentiment are in any case to be highly commended, even though the judgment of the author is not always able to cut itself loose from a certain bias for traditional opinion. The author having in an earlier work, entitled "*Grundriss der evangelischen Glaubens- u. Sittenlehre*," set forth his fundamental conceptions of ethics, does not dwell upon them in the present volume. It is perhaps this combination of ethical principles with dogmatics in Runze's teaching that accounts for what appears to me from a scientific and philosophical point of view the greatest defect in his work,—namely, the absence of a thorough criterion for practical judgment and for decision in regard to the countless controversies which are treated of in the book. This circumstance reduces the book to the level of a mere catalogue, a mere collection of material, and makes even the author's own decisions in many cases appear merely as utterances of individual emotion, and not as the result of objective investigation. It must be regarded as a useless undertaking to attempt at the present time to treat of the most difficult social ethical problems, without acknowledging openly that which alone can be, and as a matter of fact always has been, a standard of judgment, namely, the principle of welfare and of development. The Christian or Evangelical idea of life is not at all adapted to such an investigation, for it contains no criterion according to which the social value of actions and regulations can be ascertained, and merely offers a certain collection of standards, which do not suffice to decide the complicated conditions of the present time, and themselves stand in need of justification.

FR. JODL.

PRAGUE.

THE MORAL INSTRUCTION OF CHILDREN. By Felix Adler. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Pp. xi, 270. Vol. XXI., International Education Series.

It is generally agreed that the moral aim—the building of character—should hold a high place in the work of every school. But from this point forward there are diverging opinions. One says the whole scheme of school training necessarily implies moral training: there is not a subject in the curriculum whose acquisition does not involve constant exercise in the virtues of industry, veracity, perseverance, and so forth. Moreover, the whole machinery of the school is a discipline in punctuality, regularity, or achievement. Besides, the subject-matter of instruction itself, especially the literature and history, is rich in illustrative moral lessons. In its lessons and its discipline, therefore, a well-ordered school gives adequate attention both directly and indirectly to the moral instruction of its pupils. Additional moral instruction is therefore superfluous, and is likely to be worse than superfluous—positively harmful—if through needless repetition or want of tact it becomes tedious.

A second class of teachers and thinkers admit the necessity of explicit moral